

cessful defence of the fort,"—to use the language of the Secretary of War,—or until the Government, in anticipation of such a crisis, should order him to evacuate the post. "No doubt he felt acutely the difficulties of his situation. The demands upon his vigilance were unceasing. His patience was sometimes tried by the conduct of the South Carolinians. His judgment was called upon to act on questions of an unfamiliar and often perplexing nature. His most cherished feelings as an officer of the army were continually exposed to insult and outrage. "The truth is," he wrote later to the Adjutant-General, "that the sooner we are out of this harbor the better. Our flag runs an hourly risk of being insulted, and my hands are tied by my orders, and, if that was not the case, I have not the power to protect it. God grant that neither I nor any other officer of our army may be again placed in a position of such mortification and humiliation."

Anderson, however, was himself in part responsible for remaining in this anomalous and painful situation. There were, as he well knew, two ways, and only two ways, out of it; and to one of these he was most averse. He knew by the end of January that the net was fast closing around him and his command; that if any relief was ever to

reach the^m,
it must be sent at once. But he knew
also that the
sending of any relief would be opposed
by all the
force which the State of South Carolina
could mus-

¹ Anderson to Thomas, 6 April, 1861 ; I W. R. 245. At this
time, it is
true, the situation had become worse for Anderson, but the
main features of
it had existed unchanged for three months. See also
Anderson to Thomas,
4 April, 1861 ; I W. R., 237.